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Recently, I was summoned for jury duty. Contrary to the instinctual fight or
flight response most people would have, I embraced the opportunity. I am a
sociologist; I study and teach about crime and the criminal justice system, and I
was enthusiastic to participate and watch a case unfold in real life, rather than in
the abstract or hypothetical examples I inflict on my students.
I arrived promptly outside the courthouse, where I was immediately sized up
by the bail bondsmen who were eager for business. When the doors opened at
8:15 A.M., my peers and I shuffled in, a few dressed in what I also interpreted as
"appropriate courtroom attire"-perhaps best described as office casual; most,
however, were in jeans and what I might be found wearing when mowing the lawn
or leaving the gym. Clearly, the law was something to be revered. This was an
observation confirmed many times over throughout the morning, as my juror
colleagues complained about their time being wasted and discussed strategies for
"getting out of it." My favorites included those who claimed they would pretend
to be racist and prejudiced against everyone, and one especially creative woman
who feigned the inability to speak English, then smiled broadly and perkily said,
"Have a nice day!!" in flawless English on her way out, having successfully
escaped.
I was patient and attentive through videos describing civic duty and juror
responsibilities. I learned the history of the jury system and the dos and don'ts of
juror etiquette (such as not doing investigative work or listening to or reading
about the assigned case in the news). I listened politely as fellow citizens posing
as armchair criminologists offered their own theories as to why a well-known local
dentist had been arrested recently for stealing high-end automobiles.
Later in the morning, fortified with all the free coffee we could consume, we
were corralled and escorted to a courtroom, several of us into the prestigious jury
box, the remainder into rows of pews neatly lined up around the room. As the
judge described the case, I realized I had not given much thought to this task. I
assumed I would hear interesting, though in some ways, I realized, mundane
details about a crime-harm suffered by one fellow citizen at the hands of another.
The judge sagely informed us of the unique opportunity before us, a privilege
bestowed upon precious few citizens; apparently, according to the expressions of
those around me, "privilege" is both a relative and a pejorative term. At first,
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"penalty phase" was mentioned almost in passing, so subtly as to nearly escape
detection. For me, however, it hit like a bolt of lightning. Dismayed, I realized
this was a capital case; twelve people in that cold room with its fake wood would
decide "death" or "life without parole." This realization was confirmed when the
judge explained that the defendant had already been convicted of a double
homicide, some details of which he was kind enough to share with us. Our task, as
it turned out, would be to determine how he would be punished for these crimes.
As a researcher and educator, I am quite familiar with the topic of capital
punishment; it is a component in several of my courses. Perhaps this is why I
figured I had a better chance of actually being struck by lightning or winning the
lottery than sitting in the jury pool for a capital case.' As a criminologist, I have
found myself concerned with marginalized and vulnerable populations, including
juveniles, female inmates, and those affected by the death penalty. I suppose it is
no accident that my research and teaching interests have coincided with my
personal values concerning human rights and the welfare of others. However, I
have not been one to wear my attitudes like a badge. In fact, when I first began
teaching, I tried to be elusive about my personal beliefs; I presented the evidence
and let students decide for themselves, though I secretly hoped my lectures would
leave little doubt in their minds which side of the debate (abolitionist) was most
logical. Over time, I realized the futility of this effort; when I presented the
arguments for and against the death penalty, my passion for the latter was obvious.
I took comfort in the advice of a former colleague who reassured me that students
have unlimited opportunities to hear the "wrong" things all day; it was my duty to
present them with the "right" things. Now I would confront the issue from an
entirely new perspective, on a personal level I had never anticipated. Duty in the
classroom is one thing; duty in the courtroom, another. At that point, I was not
sure whether I would have the courage to maintain my convictions.
We were given a survey to complete-nine pages of seemingly innocuous
questions about our backgrounds--demographics, education, and job experience.
My interest was piqued when I reached questions about the kind of books I read,
the radio stations I listen to, and my favorite television programs (I must confess I
was a little embarrassed to admit my top choices included "24," "Prison Break,"
and "The Shield"). The survey included questions about professional and social
organizations to which I belonged or had been involved. I'm a criminologist; my
professional organizations included the American Society of Criminology and the
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, so I listed those as requested. I had also
been involved with Amnesty International and the Connecticut Network to Abolish
the Death Penalty, and the irony was not lost on me (a follow-up question asked
whether any of those groups had taken a position on the death penalty-I believed
that would be self-evident). I was asked whether I had taken any courses in which
the death penalty had been discussed; I wondered whether it would be relevant to
1 At that time, Connecticut had eight individuals on death row; nearly all of them had come
from other counties.
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mention that I also taught many of those classes, or was I just being arrogant.
There was a question about activism; I had spent a day with Sister Helen Prejean,
sponsored a campus lecture by David Kaczynksi (representing New Yorkers
Against the Death Penalty), and attended an Amnesty International conference on
the death penalty-but was that really activism? Oddly, there was no question
about publications (though I had co-authored a published textbook chapter on the
topic).
Then came the zinger-the question that would consume my thoughts over
the next several days--"Is your opinion such that you would not be able to vote to
impose the death penalty under any circumstances?" Having just listened to the
rhetoric about civic duty and juror responsibility, I must admit I was swayed by the
argument that being a juror doesn't mean you have to agree with the law, but
whether you can apply it. To say I could not impose such a sentence under any
circumstances seemed so absolute; in the abstract, I thought I might be able to
apply the law, even though I certainly disagreed with it.
Prior to completing our surveys, we had been asked to disclose whether we
knew any of the parties who might be called as potential witnesses. One of the
prosecutors whose name was called had been an adjunct in my department.
Though ultimately this would not exclude me from the pool, it did bump me to the
front of the line for determining who would be called back for questioning. Thus
began my initial t~te-d-tete with the judge. For the first time in my life, I took a
seat on the witness stand, a rather sobering and intimidating experience.
Fortunately we were questioned individually, so the audience in the courtroom was
relatively small-attorneys, court staff, a group who appeared to be students, and
the defendant. When I explained how I knew the prosecutor whose name had been
read, the judge asked me what I teach. When I replied, "I'm a criminologist," I
detected a slight murmur in the courtroom. The judge smirked and followed with,
"And just what qualifies you to be a criminologist?" I explained that I had earned
both an M.A. and a Ph.D. in sociology and was a tenured associate professor,
though I felt more like a twelve-year-old girl sitting there, looking up at the big
man wearing a black robe and a look of delight not unlike the one my cat used to
get when he had trapped a mouse. He smirked again and said, "You know, I'm
sort of a criminologist." "If you say so," I replied, suddenly all too aware of the
court reporter's tap-tap-tapping.
The main question at hand was whether my work schedule would permit me
to attend the trial, should I be selected. It would not begin until fall and would
likely last several weeks. As luck might have it, I would be on sabbatical during
the time needed. Once again the judge smirked and commented on his need for a
sabbatical. "Wow," I thought, "Can't wait to see this guy again."
The next week was filled with much soul-searching and dread. This was, as
the judge would later so eloquently state, "the real deal" and not some abstract
classroom discussion. I was appalled at myself for even considering the research
potential of my participation if I was selected, though I assumed I would likely be
599
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
the first person the prosecutor would seek to exclude. The scientist and educator in
me wanted to demonstrate I could set aside my personal beliefs and weigh the
facts. I considered the hypocrisy of teaching students to think critically and
objectively about criminal justice issues when I was having difficulty being
neutral. I really wanted to believe I could be impartial. As voir dire approached, I
realized, begrudgingly, my inability to do so. I thought long and hard about how I
would present my beliefs when I returned the following week for questioning.
As round two with Judge Smirk began, I took a deep breath and humbly
explained the conclusion I'd reached after so much thought: that despite my best
intentions, I realized I could not truthfully say I would or could impose a death
penalty, regardless of the evidence presented to me. I thought, having admitted I
could not vote for a death sentence, I would be whisked away out of the courtroom
and allowed to resume my day. However, Judge Smirk wasn't going to let me off
that easily. From there the discussion took a perplexing turn. Essentially, I was
asked to give a mini-lecture on the death penalty to explain why I held such strong
beliefs (I was even offered use of the chalkboard propped in the corner, for my
convenience). I mentioned studies on cost. I mentioned deterrence (or lack
thereof). I explained that it seemed irrational to me, given the available alternative
of life without parole. And while I do have moral qualms about the death
penalty-I believe that killing cannot be justified, no matter who is doing it-I
chose to hide behind the cloak of science, perhaps as a defense mechanism. "And
have you personally studied or written anything in this area?" asked Judge Smirk.
"Well, now that you mention it..." The appropriateness and relevance of this
digression eluded me; who was really on trial here-the individual convicted of a
double homicide seated to my left, flanked by his two public defenders, or the
criminologist who had stepped out of her ivory tower to convert and corrupt the
masses? Though the judge suggested that I probably knew more about the death
penalty than he did, or anyone else in the room for that matter, he certainly did his
best to test my knowledge (my students would later take great pleasure in hearing
that). I began to wonder whether I should have attached a copy of my C.V. to the
venire questionnaire. "This is the real deal, you know, not some made up textbook
example," Judge Smirk explained to me. "I am painfully aware of that," I
responded.
Next came questions from the public defender, who basically reiterated many
of the points the judge had made. "Are you certain you could not impose a death
sentence? Can you not imagine any case in which you could?" Yes, I was pretty
certain, and no, I couldn't think of cases where I would choose a death sentence
when the available alternative was life without parole. I was asked whether I could
be objective in other types of cases. For example, if I had to hear evidence to
determine guilt or apply a sentence other than death, could 1 be objective under
those circumstances? Yes, I believe I could do that. I understand the concept of
reasonable doubt and hearing evidence about whether someone had "done it"
seemed relatively straightforward, as did balancing a period of supervision or
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incarceration to the offense committed as specified by the state statutes. This
situation, however, is qualitatively different. I was not being asked to determine
whether this individual was guilty, but if he should be executed as punishment for
his offenses. "Is this decision based on your educated opinion, or your moral
beliefs?" It was both, though I was reluctant to admit the latter. I realized the
evidence I would hear could not simply be plugged into some mathematical
equation and result in a logical and tidy answer. The fact was, a human life,
however repugnant, would be at stake, and I knew I would have considerable
difficulty arriving at a conclusion without hearing what I'd been telling my
students for years: The death penalty is poor public policy. The money devoted to
these cases (many times the cost of life in prison) would be better spent on
education, social services, and prevention programs. Taking this life would not
deter others (who are acting on impulse or under the influence of drugs or alcohol)
from committing heinous crimes. Had this crime occurred about thirty miles
north-in Springfield rather than Hartford-execution would not be an option
(because the legal definition of a capital offense varies from state to state). The
United States remains the only Western, industrialized country that takes a life as
punishment for taking a life. Killing this individual would not spare his victims'
families of pain and anguish, but would only extend their suffering as the case
continued its way through the labyrinth of appeals.
Though it was clear I would be excused, Judge Smirk wasn't about to let me
off quite so easily. "They didn't have a sociology major at my college," he said.
"Maybe they should have," I sassed, once again realizing the court reporter's
presence and his silent tapping. The judge perused my questionnaire, asking me
additional questions about my graduate studies at Bowling Green State University
(no, it was not in Kentucky, I explained) and the crime situation in my home state
of Ohio, as if it was some foreign and exotic country. He mentioned the television
shows I had listed, and commented that they all center on death and violence.
"Yes, they do," I replied, "but they are fiction" (the marshal would later confide
that "The Shield" was his favorite show, too). He posed hypothetical crime
situations involving high status offenders, corporate criminals, and people who
have everything going for them but commit crimes anyway. How would I explain
that, he wanted to know, as if I could pinpoint a single cause of crime and spare
society its troubles. I'd been there before, as it is the cross we academic types
must bear. For it to be carried out on display, and as public record, however, was
not particularly pleasant. Finally, he suggested that someday, when the outcome of
the sentencing phase had been determined, I might want to learn more about what
type of person the defendant was and the gruesome details of the offenses he had
committed. "No, I don't think I would like that," I replied, a response the judge
seemingly did not appreciate; clearly, he had his own ideas about the type of
person the defendant was.
I was ushered out of the courtroom while the judge and attorneys determined
whether I was jury-worthy. As anticipated, I was excused. I would not have to
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spend my sabbatical enduring weeks of excruciating testimony. Though serving
would not have caused me to miss work or suffer undue hardship while carrying
out my civic duty, I was spared the "privilege" of serving on that jury. In many
ways I was disappointed. Reflecting on my observations of fellow jurors, who
were annoyed and inconvenienced by their attendance, I found it troubling that
these same individuals would have the responsibility of carrying out such an
arduous task. I was reminded of a news report I'd seen about a capital case in
which jury members flipped a coin in order to resolve a deadlock. I sincerely
hoped this man's fate would not be determined in such a trivial manner.
In the days after my dismissal, curiosity got the best of me, and I decided to
browse newspaper archives to learn more about the case. I discovered that this
was in fact the court's second attempt at securing a death sentence. The defendant
was convicted, but during the first penalty phase the jury failed to reach a
unanimous decision regarding a death sentence. It only takes one, and I would not
be it. Perhaps what Judge Smirk had implied during his interrogation of me was
true: "Those who can do, those who can't teach.",2
2 In October 2006, a jury sentenced the defendant to death.
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